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We propose a content-based semi-fragile watermarking algorithm for image authentication. In content-based watermarking
scheme for authentication, one of the most challenging issues is to define a computable feature vector that can capture the major
content characteristics. We identify Zernike moments of the image to generate feature vector and demonstrate its good robustness
and discriminative capability for authentication. The watermark is generated by quantizing Zernike moments magnitudes (ZMMs)
of the image and embedded into DWT (Discrete Wavelet Transform) subband. It is usually hard to locate the tampered area
by using global feature in the content-based watermarking scheme. We propose a structural embedding method to locate the
tampered areas by using the separability of Zernike moments-based feature vector. The authentication process does not need the
original feature vector. By using the semi-fragilities of the feature vector and the watermark, the proposed authentication scheme
is robust to content-preserved processing, while being fragile to malicious attacks. As an application of our algorithm, we apply it
on Chinese digital seals and the results show that it works well. Compared with some existing algorithms, the proposed scheme
achieves better performance in discriminating high-quality JPEG compression from malicious attacks.
1. Introduction
With the development of advanced image editing software, it
has become easier to modify or forge digital image [1]. When
the digital image contains important information, its cred-
ibility must be ensured. So a reliable image authentication
system is necessary. Because the image can allow for lossy
representations with graceful degradation, the image authen-
tication system should be able to tolerate some commonly
used incidental modification, such as JPEG compression
and noise corruption. Therefore, the traditional bit-by-bit
verification based on cryptographic hash is no longer a
suitable way to authenticate the image. Image authentication
that validates based on the content is desired [2].
In the literature, image authentication can be roughly
classified into two categories, visual-hash-based [3–5]
and watermark-based [6–22]. In visual-hash-based system,
authentication information needs extra channel to transmit
or store. In watermarked-based system, the authentication
information is imperceptibly embedded in the image rather
than appended to it, eliminating the extra storage require-
ments of visual-hash-based system [2]. The watermark-
based system may be further divided into two categories,
content-independent watermarking [6–11] and content-
based watermarking [13–22]. The security of content-
independent watermarking scheme is not so good. Due
to the fact that the watermark in this kind of method
is content independent and the detection of tampering is
mainly based on the fragility of the hidden watermark, a wise
malicious manipulation that does not change the watermark
will cheat the scheme. For example, the algorithms in [6]
and [7] cannot detect the modifications that are multiples
of watermarking quantization steps, which may be exploited
to pass an image with large modification as authentic [12].
In content-dependent watermarking scheme, the general
framework for authentication includes the following parts.
(i) Generating feature vector from the host image.
(ii) Embedding quantized feature vector as watermark
into the host image and getting the watermarked
image.
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(iii) Authenticating the test image by comparing the
watermark extracted from the test image and the
feature vector generating from the test image.
One of the most challenging issues of this framework
is to define a feature vector. An ideal feature vector for
authentication should have the following properties.
(i) It is computable and can capture the major content
characteristics [12].
(ii) It is semi-fragile. It is robust to diﬀerent incidental
manipulations while fragile to malicious manipula-
tions.
(iii) It has good discriminative capability. It is able to
distinguish malicious manipulations from incidental
ones.
Without these properties, the feature-based watermark will
degenerate as a content-independent watermark in authenti-
cation.
A number of features have been proposed in content-
based watermarking schemes for image authentication. In
[13], Lin and Chang found that the magnitude relation-
ship between two coeﬃcients remains invariable through
repetitive JPEG compression. The authentication could be
verified by a 1-bit signature which represents the magnitude
relationship between the two coeﬃcients. It is an elegant
algorithm. However, the drawback of the method is that
once the DCT pairs are known, an attacker can easily
modify DCT coeﬃcients and keep the original relationship
unchanged [14]. The algorithm in [15] extends and improves
the scheme in [13] by generating the signature bit from
the diﬀerence between two wavelet coeﬃcients to which a
random bias is added. The signature is inserted into the
wavelet coeﬃcients using nonuniform quantization-based
method. Though the method of feature extraction increases
the diﬃculty of the attacker to manipulate the feature, it
cannot get the global information of the original image.
In [16], the robust signature is cryptographically gener-
ated on the basis of invariant features called significance-
linked connected component extracted from the image and
then signed and embedded into the wavelet domain as
a watermark using the quantization-based method. The
algorithm of feature extraction produces too many bits
of watermark information, which reduces the robustness.
In [17], according to the approximation component and
the energy relationship between the subbands of the detail
components in DWT domain, global feature and local
feature are both generated. Then the global watermark and
local watermark are generated from global feature and local
feature, respectively. This scheme has lower false positive
probability than Lin and Chang’s scheme in [13] and the
false positive probability is 0.07% when quality factor of
JPEG compression is 70. In [18], Tsai and Chien proposed
an authentication scheme with recovery of tampered area.
The features for watermark are generated from LL2 bands
of DWT and embedded into the high-frequency bands.
This method needs additional information to extract the
watermark, and when recovery is achieved, the quality of the
image degrades a lot. In [19], the entropy of the probability
distribution of gray level values in block is used to generate
binary feature mask. Positions of malicious manipulations
can be localized. In [20], five features are generated and
tested. Some are block-based local features, such as edge
shape, standard deviation and mean value, and some are
frame-based global features, such as edge shape and statis-
tical feature. With global features, the location of attacked
areas cannot be recognized. With local features, there are
some problems in tolerance to the incidental operations,
especially with the block-based edge shape feature. In [21],
the image is partitioned into nonoverlapping 4 × 4 pixel
blocks in the spatial domain. The mean values of these blocks
form n-dimensional vectors, which are quantized to the
nearest lattice point neighbors. However, it is not robust
to JPEG compression. In [22], the authors proposed to
extract content-based features from the DWT approximation
subband to generate two complementary watermarks: edge-
based watermark to detect the manipulations and content-
based watermark to localize tampered regions.
In content-based watermarking scheme for image
authentication, in order to locate the tampered areas, local
feature is usually computed and embedded locally, just like
the algorithms in [13, 15, 16, 19–22]. However, restricted by
the embedding capacity and invisibility of the watermarked
image, the watermark generated by local feature should be
low bitrate. Thus the feature will not have the first property
listed above and the algorithm is susceptible to attack, such as
the feature in [13, 20]. Global feature can generate relatively
lower bitrate watermark, but it is usually hard to locate the
tampered areas, such as the global features in [20]. All the
feature vectors in the existing schemes are assumed to have
the second and third characteristics. However, they are not
addressed and analyzed explicitly.
In this paper, we propose to use Zernike moments to
generate feature vector. By using this global feature, we can
decide whether the image is maliciously manipulated or not
and locate the tampered areas. At first, we identify Zernike
moments to generate feature vector and demonstrate its
good semi-fragile and discriminative capability for authen-
tication. Moments have been utilized as pattern features
in many applications to achieve invariant recognition of
image pattern. Of various types of moments defined in
the literature, Zernike moments have been shown to be
superior to the others in terms of their insensitivity to image
noise, information content, and ability to provide faithful
image representation [23] and thus have been used in many
applications [24–28], for example, invariant watermarking
[26–28] to resist RST (rotation, scale, and translation)
manipulations. But there is little research on the semi-
fragility and discriminative capability of Zernike moments
when diﬀerent kinds of manipulations are applied to the
image in authentication application. In this paper, we analyze
and demonstrate these properties of Zernike moments.
Then, we propose a Zernike moments-based semi-fragile
watermarking algorithm in DWT domain. It is usually hard
to locate the tampered areas using global feature. We propose
a structural embedding method to solve this problem by
using the separability of Zernike moments feature vector,
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which can be separated into individual moments. The
authentication process uses a two-stage decision method.
In the first stage, we decide if the test image is maliciously
manipulated by a metric measure. In the case of malicious
manipulation, we further locate the tampered areas in the
second stage.
Experimental results show that the proposed authentica-
tion scheme has better performance in discriminating high-
quality JPEG compression from malicious manipulations
when compared with some existing methods. We also
test the performance of the proposed method under the
situation in which malicious manipulation is followed by
other manipulations. Under this situation, the system can
work well too. Our scheme can be used on diﬀerent kinds
of images. The experiments on Chinese digital seals support
this conclusion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
Zernike moments and their semi-fragile property. The out-
line of the proposed system, content-based watermark and
its structural embedding method, and how to authenticate
an image are described in Section 3. Section 4 demonstrates
the experimental results and the analysis. Conclusions and
discussions of future works are shown in Section 5.
2. Zernike Moments Magnitudes and
Semi-Fragile Property
In content-based watermarking scheme for image authen-
tication, extraction of feature vector is one of the most
challenging issues. An ideal feature vector should have three
properties listed in Section 1. In this section, we propose
to generate feature vector based on Zernike moments and
analyze the properties of this feature vector. The invariance
of Zernike moments, that is, the robustness to geometric
distortions, has been investigated by the authors of [24, 26,
28]. But the semi-fragile property of Zernike moment has
not been investigated in literature. In this section, we will
demonstrate this property and explain how to discriminate
malicious manipulations from incidental manipulations by
using it. Some of the materials in the following are based on
[24, 28].
2.1. Zernike Moment. In [29], Zernike introduced a set of
complex polynomials that form a complete orthogonal set
over the interior of the unit circle, x2 + y2 = 1. Let the
set of these polynomials be denoted by {Vnm(x, y)}. The
















where n is a non-negative integer and m is an integer
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(4)
Zernike moments are the projection of the image func-
tion onto these orthogonal basis functions. The Zernike
moment of order n with repetition m for a continuous
image function f (x, y) that vanishes outside the unit circle
is













For a digital image, we have














, x2 + y2 ≤ 1. (6)
To compute the Zernike moments of a given image, the
center of the image is taken as the origin and the pixel
coordinates are mapped to the range of the unit circle. Those
pixels falling outside the unit circle are not used in the
computation. Note that A∗nm = An,−m.
Suppose that one knows all moments Anm up to
order Nmax of f (x, y). Using orthogonality of the Zernike














Note that as Nmax approaches infinity, f̂ (x, y) will
approach f (x, y).
The reconstruction process is illustrated in Figure 1. For
a 64× 64 gray image of letter A, the reconstructed images are
generated by using (7) followed by mapping the pixel value
to [0, 255]. It shows that the lower-order moments capture
gross shape information and the high-frequency details are
filled in by higher-order moments.
According to the research in [24] and our experiments,
Zernike moments with 12-order have a good trade-oﬀ
between performance (detecting accuracy) and computation
complexity, which will be illustrated in Section 2.2.
2.2. Semi-Fragile Property of Zernike Moments-Based Feature
Vector. In authentication, semi-fragile means that the feature
vector is robust to commonly used incidental modifications
that preserve the perceptual quality while fragile to malicious
manipulations. Although classification of incidental and
malicious manipulations depends on a specific application,
in most cases, JPEG compression and slight noise corruption
are generally regarded as incidental manipulation, while
cut and replace as malicious manipulations. We adopt this
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(a) (b) 4-order (c) 8-order (d) 12-order (e) 15-order
Figure 1: Reconstruction of a gray image. From left to right: the original image, the reconstructed image with order 4, 8, 12 and 15,
respectively.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 2: Some example images.
point of view and investigate the semi-fragile property of
the Zernike moments-based feature vector. We also verify
the robustness of Zernike moments to rotation through
experiments. The moments are computed by keeping the size
of manipulated image unchanged.
The semi-fragile property is described by the distance
between two images. Each image is represented by a N-
dimensional feature vector and the distance is computed on
two feature vectors. Smaller distance means better match of
the images. The distance between two feature vectors may be
measured using Euclidean distance [24]. In this paper, we use
absolute diﬀerence to simplify the computation. The distance



















where Z1 and Z2 are the feature vectors of the images f1(x, y)
and f2(x, y). Zi = (ZMMi,1,ZMMi,2, . . . ,ZMMi,N ) =
(|A00|, |A11|, |A20|, . . . , |ANmaxNmax |), where ZMMi,k is the
kth Zernike moment magnitude of the feature vector Zi.
Assume that f2(x, y) is obtained by processing f 1(x, y).
We measure the distance between the feature vectors of
f1(x, y) and f 2(x, y). Then we address the diﬀerence of the
distance when the following diﬀerent kinds of manipulations
are applied to f 1(x, y) and get f 2(x, y).
The experiments are conducted on 300 256× 256 images
that come from [30]. Some of them are shown in Figure 2.
Each image is processed by
(i) JPEG with QF ∈ [90, 80, 70, 60, 50, 40, 30, 20],
(ii) additive noise with varying strength Sn ∈ [1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6] and [−5 Sn, 5 Sn] noises are added ran-
domly,
(iii) rotation with increasing angle ∈ [5◦, 15◦, 25◦, 35◦,
45◦],
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Table 1: Comparison of 8-order, 12-order, and 15-order Zernike moments.
8-Order 12-Order 15-Order
Distinguishing Incidental SEs identified as malicious 31 65 95
Ability Malicious SEs identified as incidental 366 327 316
Computation time (second) for a 256× 256 image 1.6607 4.1001 6.9235
(iv) cutting out blocks at randomly chosen areas. The
block sizes are 16 by 16, 24 by 24, 32 by 32, 40 by
40, and 48 by 48, respectively,
(v) Replacing the cut block by other content. The block
sizes are 16 by 16, 24 by 24, 32 by 32, 40 by 40, and 48
by 48, respectively.
The first three kinds of manipulations are regarded as
incidental ones, while the last two kinds of manipulations
are regarded as malicious ones. Thus we get 29 processed
images for each original image. Totally we have 8700
processed images. We measure the distance between Zernike
moments based feature vectors of the original image and
its manipulated image by (8). Zernike moments of 8-order
(25 moments), 12-order (49 moments), and 15-order (72
moments) are tested in experiments. The results are shown
in Figure 3. Figures 3(a), 3(c), and 3(e) demonstrate the dis-
tribution of the distances, where x-axis represents manipula-
tions and y-axis is log10(SE( f1(x, y), f2(x, y))). From Figures
3(a), 3(c), and 3(e), we can see that distances between the
feature vectors of the original images and their incidentally
manipulated images are usually much smaller than those
between the feature vectors of the original images and
their maliciously manipulated images, and thus can be
classified into two groups. One group includes most of the
distances obtained from the incidental manipulations and
another includes most of those obtained from the malicious
manipulations. We also give the histograms of the distances,
one for the incidental manipulations and the other for the
malicious manipulations, which are shown in Figures 3(b),
3(d), and 3(f), where x-axis represents the distance and y-
axis is the number of occurrences of the distance. From
Figures 3(b), 3(d), and 3(f), we can see that two histograms
are separated clearly. Figure 3 tells that we can separate these


















where T1 is a predefined threshold, which will be given in
Section 4 through experiments.
Obtained from Figure 3, we also list in Table 1 the
performance of distinguishing incidental from malicious
attacks for 8-order, 12-order, and 15-order Zernike moments
by using the SEs. The computing time of Zernike moments
for a 256×256 test image with individual order is also given.
As can be seen in Table 1, when the order grows from 8 to
15, incidental SEs are more easily regarded as malicious ones
while malicious SEs are less easily regarded as incidental ones;
at the same time, the computing time increases gradually.
Thus, 12-order Zernike moments would gain an overall
better performance by considering the distinguishing ability
and computing complexity, compared with 8-order and 15-
order Zernike moments. In the following sections, we will
adopt 12-order, 49 Zernike moments to generate the feature
vector. The detailed distributions of 12-order SEs used in our
experiments are illustrated in Figure 4.
Assume that f2(x, y) is obtained by cutting a block from
f1(x, y). We also conduct the experiments to address the
relationship between SE(f1(x, y), f2(x, y)) and the size of cut
block in the image. The results on the images in Figure 2 are
shown in Figure 5, where x-axis is the size of the cut block
and y-axis is SE(f1(x, y), f2(x, y)). We can observe that the
distance between the original image and the processed image
becomes larger when the size of the cut block increases.
It means that the distance of feature vector can reflect the
degree of the content change of the image.
3. Proposed Authentication Algorithm
In this section, the Zernike moments-based watermarking
algorithm for authentication is given. The framework, the
structural embedding method of the Zernike moments-
based watermark, the location of the tampered areas, and the
authentication process are described.
3.1. The Framework of the Proposed Scheme. Figure 6 gives
the block diagrams of the embedding and authentication
processes.
The embedding steps are as follows.
(i) Compute 49 ZMMs of the host image f1(x, y) .
Each ZMM is quantized to 12 bits and the 9
most significant bits are selected to be part of the
watermark.
(ii) Apply 3-level DWT to f1(x, y)and get 10 subbands,
LL3, HL3, LH3, HH3, HL2, LH2, HH2, HL1, LH1,
HH1, where the low frequency subband LL3 is a low
pass approximation of the original image.
(iii) The watermark generated from ZMMs is structurally
embedded in LL3 subband.
(iv) IDWT is applied and the watermarked image is
obtained.
The authentication steps are as follows:
(i) Compute 49 ZMMs of the test image f2(x, y).
(ii) Apply 3-level DWT to f2(x, y) and extract watermark
from LL3 subband. The watermark is restored as
49 ZMMs, which is the estimation of 49 ZMMs of the
original host image f1(x, y).
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Figure 3: The distribution of the distances.








































































































Figure 4: The distribution of SEs in order 12.
(iii) The first decision stage. Compute SE( f1(x, y),
f2(x, y))and compare it with a predefined threshold
to decide whether the test image is authentic or not.
In the case of inauthentic, go to next step.
(iv) The second decision stage. Locate the attacked area
by using the structure of the embedded watermark.
3.2. Structural Embedding Method and Location of Attacked
Area. In content-based watermarking scheme, it is usually
hard to locate the tampered areas by using global feature.
In our system, we locate the tampered regions using the
blockwise method by resorting to the separability of the
Zernike moments-based feature vector and the change of
watermark.
From the description in Section 2, we can know that
the Zernike moments-based feature vector is composed by
individual ZMMs. Each ZMM can be embedded separately
into a block. When some parts of the watermarked image
are changed, the ZMMs embedded in these areas will be
changed and thus can be used to locate the tampered areas.
The structural embedding method is as follows.
(i) LL3 subband is segmented into nonoverlapped 3 × 3
blocks.
(ii) For each ZMM1,i in the feature vector Z1 of f1(x, y),
we randomly select a block by a secret key to embed
it. If the blocks are more than ZMMs in number,
then some of ZMMs can be embedded repeatedly.
The secret key can be used to improve the security
of the scheme.
(iii) ZMM1,i is embedded in the selected block with one
bit in one coeﬃcient. The embedding method we
adopted can be found in [31],
A′(i) = A(i)− A(i) mod Sw + 34Sw if X = 1,
A′(i) = A(i)− A(i) mod Sw + 14Sw if X = 0,
(10)
where A(i) and A′(i) are the DWT coeﬃcients before and
after embedding, respectively. X is the watermark bit. Sw is
the watermark strength which is a positive natural number.
The watermark bit X ′can be extracted by the following
method:
A′(i) mod Sw ≥ 12Sw then X
′ = 1,
A′(i) mod Sw <
1
2






1,i are the ith ZMMs in
Z1 embedded in and extracted from the selected jth block,
respectively. The authentication process is as follows.
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(i) Compute 49 ZMMs, ZMM2,i (i = 1 − 49), of the
feature vector Z2 of the test image f2(x, y).
(ii) Extract the watermark and get ẐMM
( j)
1,i from each
block of LL3 subband of f2(x, y).
(iii) In the first stage, the authenticity of the image is























where T1 is a predefined threshold. Z˜1 is the estimation of
Z1 and restored from the extracted watermark ẐMM
( j)
1,i by
averaging those with same i.















jth block is not attacked otherwise,
(13)





1,i . In our scheme, they are estimated
from Z2. That is, we assume that each ZMM2,i in Z2 is
embedded and get its corresponding block by the same
secret key used in embedding side and get Z˜MM
( j)
1,i . We
will demonstrate that it is reasonable to estimate ZMM
( j)
1,i
from Z2 by an example in the following part.
There are three parameters in our schme. T1 in (12) can
be selected by the ROC (Receiver Operator Characteristic,
shown in Section 4) of the scheme and the requirements
of the false positive probability and the false negative
probability. T2 in (13) is set as 512 by extensive experiments
and Sw is chosen to be 64.
Figure 7 demonstrates the method of locating the tam-
pered area. Figures 7(a1), 7(a2), and 7(a3) are the original
image f1(x, y), the watermarked image, and the maliciously
manipulated image f 2(x, y). The cars on the road of
Figure 7(a2) are copied and pasted to get Figure 7(a3). The
diﬀerences between ZMM1,i and ZMM2,i of Figure 7(a1)
and Figure 7(a3) are shown in the left image of Figure 7(a4).
X-axis represents serial number of ZMMs and y-axis
represents |ZMM1,i − ZMM2,i|. The errors between the
extracted watermark ẐMM
( j)
1,i from jth block of Figure 7(a)
and the original watermark ZMM
( j)
1,i embedded in jth block
are shown in the right image of Figure 7(a3). X-axis repre-











16× 16 24× 24 32× 32 40× 40 48× 48
Size of cut
Figure 5: The relationship between distance and the size of cut
block.
y-axis represents |ZMM( j)1,i − ẐMM( j)1,i |. From Figure 7(a4),
we can observe that malicious manipulation introduces
much greater changes to the embedded watermarks in the
tampered blocks than to the individual components of the
feature vector. So using the estimated watermark Z˜MM
( j)
1,i in
(13) will not aﬀect the locating of tampered areas too much.





1,i is shown in Figure 7(a5). X-
axis represents the serial number of the block in LL3 subband
and y-axis represents |Z˜MM( j)1,i − ẐMM( j)1,i |. We can observe
that the bursts in the right image of Figure 7(a4) are still
kept in Figure 7(a5). Figure 7(a6) shows the location result by
comparing the errors in Figure 7(a5) with T2. From Figure 7,
we can see that the structural embedding method is eﬀective
in locating the tampered areas by resorting to the location of
the changed watermark.
3.3. The Robustness ofWatermark to IncidentalManipulations.
The robustness of watermark to incidental manipulations
is very important in authentication, because the extracted
watermark is used to estimate original feature vector of the
image and decide if the test image is authentic. We measure
the robustness of the watermark by computing the distance
between the original feature vector of the image and the
estimated feature vector from the extracted watermark by
(8). The experiments are conducted on the 300 images used
in Section 2.2. Each watermarked image is processed by
(i) JPEG with QF ∈ [90, 80, 70, 60, 50],
(ii) additive noise with varying strength Sn ∈
[1, 2 , 3 , 4 , 5].
The histogram of the distance is shown in Figure 8, where
x-axis represents the distance and y-axis is the occurrence
number of the distance. From Figure 8, we can see that most
of the distance is zero. It means that the extracted watermark
is equal to the embedded watermark in most cases and thus
the watermark is robust to high-quality JPEG compression
and noise.
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Serial number of the block
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(a6)
Figure 7: Demonstration of the location method of the attacked area.
10 EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing
Table 2: Some Pf p and Pf n.
T1 Number of the false negative image Pf n Number of the false positive image Pf p
2680 7 0.0023 77 0.0257
2820 10 0.0033 69 0.0230
3000 14 0.0047 65 0.0217
3320 17 0.0057 63 0.0210
3940 20 0.0067 61 0.0203
4300 25 0.0083 60 0.0200
4900 30 0.0100 59 0.0197
6700 44 0.0147 49 0.0163
8000 56 0.0187 47 0.0157




















20 30 40 50 60 70
Sum error of watermark
Figure 8: The robustness of watermark to incidental manipula-
tions.
4. Experimental Results
To demonstrate the power of our authentication system, we
study the ROC of the scheme and set the threshold T1. Then
we present some results obtained by applying only malicious
or incidental manipulation on standard test images and
Chinese seal images. We also demonstrate the results of
locating the tampered areas when the image is processed by
combining malicious manipulation with JPEG compression,
sharpening, or blurring. Comparisons with some existing
schemes will also be presented.
4.1. ROC and Threshold. Experiments are performed on 300
images that come from [30], which do not include the images
used in Section 2. All of these images are watermarked and
then processed by two kinds of manipulations as follows.
(i) Malicious attacks. Adding, erasing, and replacing















−1.8 −1.7 −1.6 −1.5 −1.4 −1.3 −1.2 −1.1 −1
log10(Pfp)
Figure 9: ROC curve.
(ii) Non-malicious manipulations. Compressing by
JPEG with QF ∈ [90, 80, 70, 60, 50] and adding
Gaussian noise with strength Sn ∈ [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].
We generate 6000 processed images. Among them 3000
images are produced by incidental manipulations and 3000
images are generated by malicious attacks. Pfp and Pfn are
used to represent the false positive probability and the false
negative probability, respectively. Some Pfp and Pfn under
diﬀerent thresholds are shown in Table 2. Our observation
shows that the false positive image usually is the JPEG
compressed image with QF 50 and the false negative image
is usually the maliciously manipulated image with small
size content change. The ROC of the scheme is shown in
Figure 9, where x-axis is log10(Pfp) and y-axis is log10(Pfn).
The thresholds are between 2680 and 9000. T1 is set as 3320
in our experiments because we can get relatively low Pfp and
Pfn at the same time by using this threshold.
4.2. Authentication Results When Single Attack Is Applied.
The experiments are firstly conducted on the standard test
images in Figure 10. The PSNRs of their watermarked images
are shown in Table 3. Table 4 lists the authentication results
when JPEG compressions are applied to their watermarked
images. Figure 11 shows the tamper localization results when
malicious attacks are applied to some of them. Then we
EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing 11
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Figure 10: The test images.
Table 3: PSNRs obtained by watermarking the images in Figure 10.
Image in Figure 10 I01 I02 I03 I04 I05 I06 I07 I08 I09 I10
PSNR (dB) 42.6 42.5 42.3 42.2 42.4 42.6 42.7 42.0 42.3 42.8
Image in Figure 10 I11 I12 I13 I14 I15 I16 I17 I18 I19 I20
PSNR (dB) 42.1 42.6 42.4 42.3 42.8 42.7 42.3 42.9 42.5 42.9
conduct experiments on Chinese seal images in Figure 12
and show the authentication results when malicious attacked
are applied to the watermarked images. Table 5 lists the
authentication results when JPEG compressions are applied
to their watermarked images. From Tables 4 and 5, we can
see that our system can successfully pass almost all the JPEG-
compressed images with QF as low as 40. As for the additive
Gaussian noise, our scheme can tolerate noisy images with
PSNR as low as 33.6 dB. From the experiment results,
we can see that the proposed scheme is robust to JPEG
compression while sensitive to malicious manipulations with
good capability in locating the attacked areas.
4.3. Authentication Results When Combined Attacks Are
Applied. The objective of this section is to check whether
our scheme can successfully detect and locate a malicious
manipulation when some other manipulations are applying
to the image simultaneously. We apply two-stage decision
method. The authenticity of the test image is firstly decided.
We observe that combined manipulations introduce more
changes to the watermark and the feature vector than single
manipulation. In first stage, SE( f1(x, y), f2(x, y)) > T1
in (12) is true and the image is regarded as maliciously
manipulated. Figure 13 shows the tampering and location
results in the second stage. The manipulations following
12 EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing
I02 I13 I15 I18
WI02 (PSNR = 42.5) WI13 (PSNR = 42.4) WI15 (PSNR = 42.8) WI18 (PSNR = 42.9)
TI02 TI13 TI15 TI18
LI02 LI13 LI15 LI18
Figure 11: Authentication results when some standard test images are maliciously manipulated where I: original standard image, WI:
watermarked image, TI: tampered watermarked image and the oval highlights the tampered part, LI: location of the attacked areas.
malicious tampering include JPEG compressions, blurring,
and sharpening. In order to compare with the algorithm in
[8], we adopt the same symbols. We can see that our scheme
can work well in most cases. In the case of a combined
manipulation involving JPEG, Figure 13 indicates that when
the quality factor is as low as 40, the detection result is still
good. In the case of a combined manipulation involving
blurring, the detection result is good when window size is
3 × 3 and becomes worse when window size increases. In
the case of a combined manipulation involving sharpening,
the results are good when the sharpening factor is smaller
than 50. When the sharpening factor exceeds 50, the result
becomes worse when the factor increases.
4.4. Performance Comparison. In authentication, one of
the most important issues is discriminating the incidental
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S01 S02 S03 S04
WS01 (PSNR = 42.3) WS02 (PSNR = 42.1) WS03 (PSNR = 42.1) WS04 (PSNR = 42)
TS01 TS02 TS03 TS04
LS01 LS02 LS03 LS04
Figure 12: Authentication results when some Chinese digital seal images are maliciously manipulated where S: original seal image, WS:
watermarked seal image, TS: tampered watermarked seal image and the oval highlights the tampered part, LS: location of the attacked areas.
and malicious attacks. Conventional content independent
watermarking approaches, such as the schemes in [7, 8,
11], do not provide a rational metric measure for the
discriminating. They use the detected attacked areas to
decide whether the image is maliciously attacked. Because
incidental manipulations can introduce error of watermark
which may be mistaken as the result of maliciously attack,
sometime the scheme does not work well. For example, in
[8], the scheme works very well on 11 of 12 test images
in Figure 10 and passes JPEG compressed images with QF
as low as 30 as authentic. But for image I20 in Figure 10,
the JPEG compressed image with QF as high as 70 is still
mistaken as maliciously attacked image. The scheme in this
paper gives a two-stage scheme and a metric measure for
the discriminating. For 20 images in Figure 10, this measure
can pass most JPEG compressed images with QF as low
as 40. The comparison between our algorithm and that
in [8] can be found in Tables 6 and 7, where Table 6
demonstrates the performance of discriminating when only
JPEG compression is applied to the images and Table 7
14 EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing
 
W image T image T T + B 3× 3 T + B 5× 5 T + B 7× 7
T + S70 T + S80 T + S90 T + J90 T + J80 T + J70
T + S10 T + S20 T + S30 T + S40 T + S50 T + S60
T + J60 T + J50 T + J40 T + J30 T + J20 T + J10
Figure 13: The detection results when combined attacks are applied to watermarked image. W image and T image denote the watermarked
image and the tampered watermarked image, respectively. The oval in T image highlights the tampered part. The symbols T, J, B and S
denote malicious tampering, JPEG-compression, blurring and sharpening, respectively. + means followed by. The number following each
symbol is the parameter adopted by the manipulation in Photoshop.
Table 4: Authentication results when JPEG compressions are applied to the corresponding watermarked images.
√
means that our scheme
regards the manipulation is incidental and ×means that our scheme regards the manipulation is malicious.
Image in Figure 10
Manipulation I01 I02 I03 I04 I05 I06 I07 I08 I09 I10
JPEG (QF > 40)
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
JPEG (QF = 40) √ √ √ √ √ √ √ × √ √
JPEG (QF = 30) × × × √ × √ × × √ ×
Image in Figure 10
Manipulation I11 I12 I13 I14 I15 I16 I17 I18 I19 I20
JPEG (QF > 40)
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
JPEG (QF = 40) √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
JPEG (QF = 30) × √ × × × × × × × ×
shows the detection results when combined manipulations
are applied to the images. From Table 6 and the experimental
results in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we can see that our scheme is
more stable in discriminating high-quality JPEG compres-
sion from malicious attacks than the approach in [8] and can
be used on diﬀerent kinds of images. Table 7 shows that our
scheme can give similar detection results for the maliciously
attacked areas as the approach in [8], but the scheme
in [8] uses the original watermark in the authentication
process.
Comparisons with some other content-independent [7,
9–11] and-dependent [22] watermarking approaches for
authentication are listed in Table 8. From Table 8, we can
see that the performance of discriminating JPEG from the
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Table 5: Authentication results when JPEG compressions are applied to the watermarked seal images.
√
and × have the same meanings as
those used in Table 4.
Images in Figure 12
Manipulation WS01 WS02 WS03 WS04
JPEG (QF > 50)
√ √ √ √
JPEG (QF = 50) √ √ √ √
JPEG (QF = 40) √ √ × √
noise (Sn ≤ 5) √ √ √ √
noise (Sn = 6) √ × √ ×
Table 6: Comparison with the scheme in [8] on images I18 and I20 in Figure 10.
The scheme in [8] The proposed scheme The scheme in [8] The proposed scheme
Images in Figure 10
Manipulation I18 I18 I20 I20
JPEG (QF >= 80) √ √ √ √
JPEG (QF = 70) √ √ × √
JPEG (QF = 60) √ √ × √
JPEG (QF = 50) √ √ × √
JPEG (QF = 40) √ √ × √
JPEG (QF = 30) √ × × ×
JPEG (QF = 20) × × × ×
Table 7: The comparison of the performance of detecting attacked
areas when combined manipulations are applied to the image I18 in
Figure 10. The symbols and the numbers have the same meanings
as those in Figure 12.
T + B T + J T + S
Proposed algorithm 3× 3 40 40
The scheme in [8] 3× 3 40 40
malicious manipulation of our scheme is superior to those of
the algorithms in [7, 9–11, 22].
Comparisons with some content-based watermarking
approaches in [13, 17] are shown in Table 9, where the data
in the last two columns come from [17]. From Table 9, we
can see that our scheme has better robustness to high-quality
JPEG compression.
5. Conclusion and Future Works
In this paper, we propose a content-based watermarking
scheme for image authentication. The contributions of this
paper are as follows:
(1) to have found the semi-fragile property of the Zernike
Moments-based feature vector.
(2) to have proposed to use Zernike feature vector
as the feature in image authentication. Extensive
experiments show that Zernike moments have good
robustness and discriminating capability for authen-
tication,
(3) to have proposed a two-stage decision method in
authentication process and a metric measure for
discriminating the incidental manipulations from
malicious attacks,
(4) by using the separability of Zernike moments-based
feature vector, a structural embedding method for the
ZMMs-based watermark is given. Extensive experi-
ments show that this method can locate the attacked
area eﬀectively. It can locate the altered blocks even if
the altered image has been lossy compressed, blurred,
or sharpened with medium strength,
(5) the proposed authentication scheme has better per-
formance of discriminating high-quality JPEG com-
pression from malicious attacks than some existing
schemes. The scheme does not need the original
feature vector for authentication process,
(6) the proposed scheme can be used on diﬀerent kinds
of images. The experiments on Chinese seal images
with a very homogeneous background support this
conclusion.
The feature vector of Zernike moments can also work
well to authenticate binary images [32] like documents and
CAD images. It can also be used in video authentication.
Our extensive experiments show that this feature vector has
good semi-fragile characteristics for video processing. Some
preliminary results on video authentication by using Zernike
moments-based feature vector has been published in [33].
Our future works include researching on the embedding
algorithm robust to geometric distortions and improving the
precision in locating the altered areas. Recovery [18] of the
tampered area will be also studied in our future work.
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PSNR(dB) 42.8 43.0 30.5 40.5 36.34 39.46
Robustness to JPEG (QF) 40 50 80 80 60 50
Table 9: Comparisons with some content-based watermarking methods (Pfp%).
Proposed algorithm Wang’s scheme in [17] Lin’s scheme in [13]
Robustness to JPEG with QF 70 0 0.07 3.1
No-attack 0 0 0.2
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